Mental Representation

Over at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy an update has recently been posted of the entry on mental representation by David Pitt.

When reading these kinds of articles, I look for a couple of things: (a) discussion of the importance of different levels of description and that they may be mapped onto each other; (b) clear language separating personal and sub-personal level descriptions.

It’s not bad. He notes for instance Smolensky’s arguments that “certain types of higher-level patterns of activity in a neural network may be roughly identified with the representational states of commonsense psychology”. BUT two issues to be separated here: classical notions of representation and how these relate to connectionist representations—and models even closer biologically; and also how phenomenology could arise from, e.g., connectionist networks.

Worth a read.


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )


Connecting to %s